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One generation succeeds another almost without acknowledgment. Or so
it seems in universities where students, who come and go recurrently, are
always the same age and teachers scarcely notice that they alone are growing
older.
This inclination to ignore the passage of time is especially strong in law
schools and legal institutions generally. When my first-year students begin our
Constitutional Law course with Marbury v. Madison,' as when the Supreme
Court cites the authority of Marbury,2 we all speak of the decision as vital,
informative, and binding as if it had been decided only yesterday. And when,
in the next breath, we criticize Marbury, identify its begged questions, and
unmask its pretensions-the delight of every first-year Con. Law course-we
are reciting a favorite folktale and entering into a great tradition. Thus Alex
Bickel began his most important book, The Least Dangerous Branch, with
Marbury on the first page followed on the second page by the assertion that
"the opinion is very vulnerable" and citations to a continuous lineage of
skeptical readers from "the late Judge Learned Hand," to Thomas Reed Powell,
to Oliver Wendell Holmes, to James Bradley Thayer.3
This impulse to stress continuities between generations is the dominant
perspective in constitutional law today. The contemporary dispute between the
t Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law. Yale Law School. The author delivered an earicr vcrsion
of this Essay on October 13, 1994, as an inaugural lecture upon assuming the Bickel chair.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 703 (1974); Cooper v. Aaron. 358 U.S. I, 18
(1958).
3. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 1-2 (Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
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originalists (such as Judge Bork4 and Justice Scalia5) and the interpreters
(such as Ronald Dworkin6 and Justice Brennan7) grows from the agreed
premise of the importance and feasibility of linkages from one generation to
the next. These disputants differ only in the techniques they recommend for
accomplishing these linkages-strict loyalty to "original understanding" for
Bork8 versus the collaborative enterprise of writing a continuous "chain novel"
in Dworkin's evocative image.9 Notwithstanding these differences, the
disputants share the same underlying vision of the generational connections
that Alex Bickel invoked on the opening pages of his book: that the same cup
passes from one generation to the next with scarcely a drop spilled.
But it is not true. Premature death disrupts this comforting cycle-as did
Alex's death in 1974 just before his fiftieth birthday. And, even when our
predecessors live their full biblical allotment, there are still sharp breaks from
one generation to the next. It is easy to overlook these disjunctions when we
discuss constitutional law and all of us-whether student or teacher, elderly
judge or younger litigant-readily imagine that we are speaking to one another
in the same terms because we cite the same cases and, indeed, meet in the
same place at the same time. This casual deduction from the observed fact of
conversational or locational contemporaneity is, however, misleading. The truth
is that, although we come together in a common place, we are speaking to one
another from different worlds, we are talking across generational lines.
The best illustration I can draw of this difference and its imperceptibility
is from the occasion when I gave the lecture on which this Essay is based,
marking my inauguration as the Yale Law School's third Alexander M. Bickel
Professor of Law. I spoke in Room 127 to an audience of students, faculty,
and other friends. A portrait of Alex Bickel dominates one wall in Room
127-a marvelous likeness that evokes his energy and dramatic presence.
There was, however, another way that Alex was in that room, a way that was
invisible to everyone, but very palpable to me.
When I was Alex's student, as a member of the Yale Law School Class
of 1964, one of my courses with him met in Room 127. In those days,
however, the room had a different configuration. It sloped from north to south
and the podium was at the southern end. Room 127 was redesigned in the mid-
1970's and it now inclines from east to west, with the podium at the western
end. Thus, in one sense, the old Room 127 is gone, obliterated. But the
4. See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990).
5. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
6. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
7. See William J. Brennan, Jr., Constitutional Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the
Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 313 (1986).
8. BORK, supra note 4, at 143.
9. DWORKIN, supra note 6, at 228.
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subterranean structure of that old room still exists and exerts some influence
on all of us.
The influence on me is obvious because the old room and Alex's presence
as my teacher are still vividly in my mind. Although I can relate my memories
to those who never knew Alex, or who never knew him as a teacher in the old
Room 127, I cannot adequately convey the vibrancy and immediacy that he
still has for me. Even when I try to conjure his presence, my listeners see only
me standing at the western podium talking about Alex Bickel; I, however, see
Alex standing at the southern podium talking to me. My listeners cannot fully
comprehend me, nor can I comprehend myself, without understanding that
Alex is still speaking to me as I am speaking to them, and that we are both
talking across generations.
The metaphor can be extended from this spatial expression in Room 127
to the intellectual structure of constitutional law theory. We all know the great
progression of constitutional law landmarks in this century: from Lochner"0
and its companion cases," where the Supreme Court regularly invoked a
substantive ideal of "liberty" to invalidate state and federal economic
restrictions; to the 1940's, when the Court, in homage to the New Deal,
overruled the Lochner line and bowed to majoritarian enactments;' 2 to Brown
v. Board of Education,3 where the Court withdrew its prior deference to
Southern race segregation laws (embodied at the beginning of the Lochner era
in Plessy v. Ferguson4); to Roe v. Wade, 5 where the Court invoked a
substantive ideal of "privacy" to invalidate state abortion restrictions. It is
possible to draw a consistent and logical order from this series of Court
decisions to find a common pattern that seamlessly joins one generation to the
next. But this harmonizing enterprise-the conventional effort of constitutional
lawyering-does not give an adequate account of the inevitable force of
generational differences in perspective. It is equally possible in retracing this
series of landmark constitutional decisions to claim, for example, that Roe is
fundamentally indistinguishable from Lochner, that both rulings were
impositions of the Justices' subjective values masquerading as constitutional
verities-"liberty" in Lochner, "privacy" in Roe-and that if the Court was
correct in overruling Lochner, then it must also overrule Roe. This is a familiar
10. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11. The Court elaborated the Lochner vision in cases such as Allgeyer v. Louisiana. 165 U.S. 578
(1897); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908); Coppage v. Kansas. 236 U.S. I (1915); Adkins v.
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
12. The Court's reversal of the Lochner line unfolded in Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NRLB. 313 U.S. 177
(1941); Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference & Bond Ass'n. 313 U.S. 236 (1941); Lincoln Fed.
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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claim today, and has recently attracted the votes of four Justices.' 6 It is also
possible to argue that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown is fundamentally
indistinguishable from Lochner and that Brown therefore was wrongly
decided-a position, now virtually eclipsed, that was taken in the 1950's not
only by Southern white supremacists but by widely respected figures. 7
I do not intend to resolve these claims. My goal is not to find consistency
among the progression of these cases or in the succession from one generation
of constitutional lawyers to the next. Nor is it my goal to establish some
hierarchy of authority, to give preemptive force to one decision or to one
generation's perspective over the others. I want instead to describe and to
understand how legal reasoning that is widely persuasive in one era becomes
less persuasive in another. I want to see what one generation can offer the next
if each of us--elders and youngsters, teachers and students-adequately
acknowledges that we speak to one another from different rooms, even though
we appear to be in the same place at the same time.
Alex Bickel is an excellent exemplar for this exploration. Alex's distinctive
vision framed the terms of debate in constitutional jurisprudence in the 1960's
and beyond. His name is known by every student of constitutional law today.
But as much as he is recognized, his ideas no longer have the same powerfully
shaping impact on constitutional law debates that they had twenty-five years
ago. The internal, logical coherence of his ideas has not changed. But the
definition of what counts as a persuasive legal reason has changed from that
time to this-not because the precedential force of one or another judicial
decision has waned or been overruled, but because the underlying conception
of the very nature of judicial authority has changed.
The core of Bickel's conception was expressed in a passage from his last
completed manuscript, The Morality of Consent, which was published
posthumously in 1975. In a chapter of the book specifically addressing judicial
decision making, Alex made this observation:
[T]he general good is achieved by pragmatic trial and error-having
regard to principle, but not dogmatically bound to it in action-which
is the genius of democratic institutions .... A Court sensitive to [this
proposition] tends to attack problems at retail, in the smallest possible
compass, illuminating ultimate principles in the glare of its headlights,
as it were, but seldom speeding ahead to seize such principles and to
16. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ.. concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (joined by White, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.). If the Senate had
confirmed Robert Bork, Alex's colleague at Yale (and the first occupant of the Bickel chair), there would
almost certainly have been a fifth vote on the Court two years ago to overrule Roe. See BORK, supra note
4, at 116 ("Roe, as the greatest example and symbol of the judiciai usurpation of democratic prerogatives
in this century, should be overturned.").
17. See LEARNED HAND, TIE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Herbert Wechsler. Toward Neutral
Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1959).
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deploy them for the definitive, authoritative resolution of large social
and political issues.
1 8
Bickel wrote this passage less than a year after the Supreme Court had decided
Roe v. Wade-a decision that clearly transgressed Bickel's injunction by
deploying an ultimate principle, "privacy" or "freedom of choice," in order to
resolve the abortion issue definitively, authoritatively. Bickel, of course, was
critical of Roe for this reason; but in the course of his criticism, almost as an
aside, he stated that "[i]t is astonishing that only two [Justices (White and
Rehnquist)] dissented from the Court's decision."' 9 Twenty years later, in
retrospect, we can see that Roe was at the edge of a generational shift. Bickel's
astonishment was an early indication of this shift.
We can most clearly see this shift in the style of legal reasoning-in the
underlying "feel" for what counts as a persuasive legal reason-by considering
the way that contemporary supporters and opponents of Roe have approached
the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Griswold v. Connecticut?° and the very
different treatment of Griswold that would follow from Bickel's conception of
judicial authority. Griswold struck down an 1879 Connecticut law forbidding
the use of contraceptives for birth-control purposes by anyone, including
married couples. Current supporters of Roe make a powerful argument that the
"right to privacy" principle enunciated in Griswold could readily be
generalized to extend to freely available abortion. Contemporary opponents of
Roe do not dispute the logic of this argument; in fact, they embrace it but turn
it upside down, as it were, to make the opposite generalized argument that
Griswold itself was wrongly decided because there was no adequate textual
basis for finding a "right to privacy" in the Constitution.'
But here is another reading, a Bickelian reading, of Griswold. In 1965,
when the Supreme Court considered the case, the Connecticut statute was
unique in the entire United States.Y A few other states restricted the sale or
distribution of contraceptives, but no other state directly provided criminal
penalties for the use of contraceptives, whether by married couples or anyone.
Moreover, the anti-use statute was notoriously unenforced in Connecticut itself
and, in fact, was virtually impossible to enforce because of the private
character of the actions. 3 Anti-abortion statutes, on the other hand, presented
radically different circumstances in 1973 when the Court considered Roe. At
that time abortions were criminally prohibited (with varying degrees of
18. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONsE "r 105-06 (1975).
19. Id. at 28.
20. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4. at 98-99 ("The Connecticut statute was not invalid under any
provision of the Bill of Rights, no matter how extended.... Griswold was] an assumption of judicial
power unrelated to the Constitution ....").
22. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554-55 (1961) (Harlan. J., dissenting).
23. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505-06 (White, J., concurring).
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stringency) in forty-six of the fifty states,' and because most abortions
involve the participation of third-party professionals who are sensitive to legal
regulation, enforcement of anti-abortion statutes was much more effective than
the enforcement of Connecticut's anticontraceptive law. Thus, as a practical
matter, judicial action striking down anti-abortion laws would have a vastly
more extensive reach than invalidation of the unique and virtually unenforced
Connecticut anticontraceptive law.
But so what? Is this a difference with any legal significance? From
Bickel's perspective, the difference in scale between the two cases would have
relevance. The special circumstances and limited reach of the Connecticut
statute gave the Court a welcome opportunity to address a larger
problem-state interventions in matters of intimate private life, the Orwellian
specter of all-intrusive Big Brother. But from Bickel's perspective, the Court
could have addressed this problem "at retail, in the smallest possible compass,"
without instantly binding everyone to a single-minded generalized principle.
From Bickel's perspective, Griswold could be justified as a judicial
intervention precisely because of its relatively contained scope; it therefore
could not serve as an ideological way station for the much broader judicial
intervention of Roe. 5 From Bickel's perspective, both the contemporary
opponents and supporters of Roe are wrong because neither group understands
how we could have Griswold without having Roe.
Today, however, this differentiation between Griswold and Roe has much
less plausibility and carries much less weight than it did thirty years ago when
Alex Bickel was my teacher. Since the early 1960's, a fundamental shift in the
dominant style of legal reasoning has occurred: Bickel's pragmatics, his
aversion to high abstraction, has been eclipsed by the generalizing spirit of Roe
v. Wade. In effect, Roe has now become the contemporary paradigmatic
constitutional law decision. Not Roe's substance, not its idea of an expansive
"right to privacy," but rather Roe's underlying conception of judicial authority
guides contemporary constitutional lawyers whether they are supporters or
opponents of Roe's substantive doctrine.
Roe's supporters obviously reject Bickel's jurisprudence in their
approbation of the Court's sweeping, definitive resolution of the abortion
dispute. Roe's supporters maintain that the "right to privacy" is sufficiently
implicit in our constitutional tradition and that the logical implications of that
principle regarding free choice are sufficiently clear to justify a broad-stroke
24. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFuCT 347-48 (1992).
25. Thus viewed, a state restriction on public distribution of contraceptives appears different from a
law forbidding their intimate use; on its way to Roe, however, the Supreme Court did not see the
difference. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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judicial conclusion of the abortion debate. 6 Roe's critics claim that the
abortion issue is not properly subject to judicial authority because the
Constitution does not explicitly endorse a "right to privacy" or "freedom of
choice" or any other generalized principle that unambiguously provides
resolution of the abortion dispute. In this assertion, Roe's critics also reject
Bickel's jurisprudence. The disagreement among critics and supporters of Roe
is about whether judges must have explicit or implicit bases in the
constitutional document to justify their actions. But both the opponents and the
supporters of Roe share the same conception of the nature of judicial
authority-that the correct role of judges is to impose definitive, authoritative
resolution of disputes properly brought before them. The most passionate
contemporary opponents and supporters of Roe thus have much more in
common with each other than any of them has with Alex Bickel.
It is in this sense that Roe v. Wade has become the contemporary
paradigmatic exercise of judicial authority. And in this sense both the
supporters and opponents of Roe endorse the same conception of judicial
authority that guided the Supreme Court in Lochner that the judiciary acts
properly when, and only when, it can invoke abstract principles of sufficient
generality and logical force to impose definitive resolution on social disputes.
In this Roe-Lochner conception, there is no independent value in judicial
incrementalism.
The mindset underlying this view of judicial authority is vividly illustrated
in a 1936 Supreme Court opinion by Justice George Sutherland. In Carter v.
Carter Coal Co.,28 the Supreme Court struck down New Deal regulatory
legislation; in holding that coal mining was not "interstate commerce" and thus
not within Congress' delegated powers, Sutherland wrote:
If the production by one man of a single ton of coal ... affects
interstate commerce indirectly, the effect does not become direct by
multiplying the tonnage, or increasing the number of men employed,
or adding to the expense or complexities of the business, or by all
combined.... [T]he matter of degree has no bearing upon the
question here ....
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle
between employers and employees over the matter of wages, working
conditions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and the resulting
strikes, curtailment and irregularity of production and effect on prices;
and it is insisted that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby.
But ... the conclusive answer is that the evils are all local evils over
26. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. CL 2791, 2846-47 (1992) (Blackmun. J.. concumng in the
judgment in part, concurring in part, and dissenting in part). See generally RONALD DWORKIN. LIFE's
DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA. AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDoM (1993)
27. See Casey, 112 S. CL at 2874-76 (1992) (Scalia. J.. concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (joined by Rehnquist, CJ., and White and Thomas. JJ.); BORK, supra note 4. at 113-16.
28. 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
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which the federal government has no legislative control.... An
increase in the greatness of the effect adds to its importance. It does
not alter its character.2
This 1936 decision was, as it turned out, the last gasp of Lochner-ism on the
Supreme Court. With the country still in the grip of the Great Depression, and
the consequent urgency of the need for national action seemingly apparent, the
Court reversed course the following year to uphold the National Labor
Relations Act.30 At first glance, this reversal seemed to signify only that the
Court would now consider scale and complexity in determining the
constitutional validity of federal regulatory legislation. But in the next five
years, it became clear that a more radical critique of judicial authority had
taken hold in the Court.3 ' By 1952, the Court could characterize its new
jurisprudence for both federal and state regulatory authority as mandating
virtually complete deference by the judiciary to majoritarian elected
institutions. 32
This anti-Lochner proposition was, however, much more than a
prescription for judicial deference; it was an attitude toward all exercise of
governmental authority. At its heart, the anti-Lochner proposition that had
become dominant by 1952 was based on a conviction that abstract principles
had very little relevance to the proper functioning of government. The central
political issue of the preceding seventy-five years had been the struggle
between labor and capital regarding the proper distribution of economic
resources. The anti-Lochner proposition signified that abstract formulations
such as "liberty" versus "equality" or an individual's "private property rights"
versus the nation's "general welfare" were not reliable guides for addressing
this struggle. The proper goal of governance institutions in responding to
economic and social conflict generally was not, from the anti-Lochner
perspective, to identify the true principle in the welter of conflicting claims and
to guarantee that this truth emerged victorious. The proper goal was, instead,
for governance institutions to foster mutual accommodation among conflicting
parties. From the anti-Lochner perspective, governance institutions should
avoid any definitive resolutions of the competing abstract principles that each
side might invoke, and instead should identify the incremental adjustments, the
ideologically inconsistent muddle that might serve as a tolerable middle ground
so that each party could walk away from the dispute as neither winner nor
loser.
29. Id. at 308-09.
30. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
31. See cases cited supra note 12.
32. See, e.g., Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 425 (1952) ("[Ilf our recent eases
mean anything, they leave debatable issues as respects business, economic, and social affairs to legislative
decision.").
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A clear implication for judicial authority appears to follow from this
normative ideal for governance. If, as Alex Bickel put it in his last completed
manuscript, "[t]he business of politics is not with theory and ideology but with
accommodation, 33 then it is difficult to see any useful role for judicial
review of the substantive terms in the majoritarian resolution of any dispute.
To the contrary, judicial review based on abstract constitutional principle casts
social disputes into win/lose, zero-sum terms, which-from this
perspective-only inflames conflict and obstructs processes of mutual
accommodation.
But if this was the clear implication of the anti-Lochner perspective for
judicial authority, how then is it possible to explain the Supreme Court's
decision in Brown v. Board of Education?3' From the dominant
jurisprudential perspective of today, Brown appears to be a judicial assertion
of high abstract principle, a triumphalist proclamation of equality to overturn
a morally evil regime of racial segregation. This is a plausible reading of
Brown-but it was not the Supreme Court's understanding of Brown in the
1950's, nor was it Alex Bickel's understanding. Brown was the most ambitious
deployment of judicial authority in our history, but the Court that decided
Brown was guided by the anti-Lochner proposition, by a deep mistrust of
abstract principle, and by an embrace of incremental accommodationism.
In the 1940's and 1950's, the claims of aggrieved black litigants were not
heard, nor were they fundamentally framed, in terms of abstract principle. The
claims were most widely understood in an egalitarian spirit as a demand that
black people be treated not as pariahs, not as permanent outcasts, but like
everyone else in American society. And in the dominant accommodationist
imagery of the day, everyone else was treated as a recognized participant
entitled to bargain in public forums for a mutually agreed share of public and
private resources. But this kind of egalitarianism was not conceived-at least
in the popular, and one might say naive, understanding of the 1940's and
1950's-as an abstract ideological principle. In those days ideological
abstractions were viewed as dividing people into artificial oppositions-into
racial opposition (such as the Nazis had imposed); ethnic or nationalist
oppositions (such as had convulsed Europe in the two World Wars); or
economic class oppositions as between labor and capital (such as had produced
revolution in Czarist Russia and that, in the early 1930's, appeared to portend
class warfare in this country).
But America was different from Nazi Germany and Bolshevik Russia. Our
difference, as it appeared in the 1940's and 1950's, was not that we had a
competing ideology; our difference was that our nation was not divided by
33. BICKEL, TE MoRALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 18. at 19.
34. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ideology.35 We were predominantly inclined to view egalitarianism as the
absence of ideology, a kind of natural human state where people were
fundamentally alike-notwithstanding the genetic accidents of skin
pigmentation or the cultural accidents of different ethnic, religious, or
economic class affiliations. There were disagreements and ideological
differences among Americans, but none that equal citizens could not peaceably
negotiate. Egalitarianism in this sense was not a principle, it was more like a
"fact of life," a perspective that would naturally arise among people if they
freed themselves from ideology, from intellectual prejudgments, and from
"prejudices" that obscured their otherwise open-minded, accommodationist
views of one another.
Except, of course, in the South, which was still in the grip of the racist
ideology of the defeated Confederacy, and where artificial distinctions between
blacks and whites persisted in the publicly imposed forms of race segregation.
White Southern racism was un-American not because it violated the equality
principle, but because-unlike equality-racism was a principle. And like all
abstract, nonnegotiable principles, racism stood in the way of peaceful,
mutually respectful, nonideologically driven, nonprejudicial human relations.
36
I put such stress on this difference-the difference between egalitarianism
as a principle, and egalitarianism as the absence, the transcendence, the
mooting of principle-because this difference must be grasped in order to
understand the reasoning that led the Supreme Court to Brown v. Board of
Education. Without a firm grasp on this difference, it is impossible to
comprehend how the same Justices who had overruled Lochner-who had
proclaimed in effect that they were rejecting the regime of "rule by
judiciary"-could take on the transformation of Southern social relations with
no explicit authorization in the text of the Constitution itself.37 But with an
understanding of the anti-Lochner proposition as these Justices themselves saw
it-as removing artificial, ideologically driven obstacles to freely conducted,
accommodationist bargaining between social disputants-then the
correspondence between anti-Lochner and Brown becomes clear.
To be sure, the obstacle that the Justices removed in overruling Lochner
was the Court's own imposition of the ideology of "individual liberty" to
override accommodationist bargaining, whereas in Brown, the obstacle to such
bargaining between whites and aggrieved Southern blacks was legislatively
rather than judicially imposed. But even on this score, the Justices who decided
Brown were acutely aware that fifty years earlier the Supreme Court's decision
35. See BURT, supra note 24, at 26-27 (discussing Louis HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN
AMERICA (1955)).
36. See id at 272-76 (discussing GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM
AND MODERN DEMOCRACY 3-5 (1944)).
37. See id. at 11-13; Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision,
69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 58-59 (1955).
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in Plessy v. Ferguson38 had explicitly endorsed Southern racism, and that
Plessy still stood as a significant judge-made impediment to the eradication of
racism. In an important sense, Brown did little more than erase Plessy in the
same way that these same Justices had overruled Lochner.
Furthermore, without grasping the fundamental similarity that the Justices
in those days saw between anti-Lochner and Brown, it is impossible to
understand how Brown I, invalidating race segregation laws, could be followed
a year later by Brown 11,39 specifying that the implementation of its ruling
should proceed on an indeterminate timetable presided over by white Southern
district court judges. The extreme modesty of Brown IH was in fact a logical
extension of the way in which Brown I itself was an application of the anti-
Lochner proposition.
In 1954 the Justices came only haltingly to the logic of the anti-Lochner
position as they agonized about whether they were justified in overruling
Plessy and invalidating Southern race segregation laws.'* But their initial
hesitancy arose because in 1954 they had still not wholly freed themselves
from the underlying assumption about judicial authority in Lochner itself-the
assumption, as Alex Bickel disparagingly characterized it, that the proper role
of the judiciary was to impose "definitive, authoritative resolution of large
social and political issues. ' The Justices' conclusion in 1955, in Brown II,
that it was appropriate to differentiate abstract declarations of constitutional
principle from the pragmatic, incremental, accommodationist application of
these principles marked their definitive break with the Lochner assumptions
about the nature of judicial authority. Brown II was the final step in overruling
Lochner.
For the generation that decided Brown, the anti-Lochner proposition was
the ruling paradigm; Brown was jurisprudentially subordinate to it. Alex Bickel
saw this with greater acuity than any other constitutional lawyer of his time.
In The Least Dangerous Branch, he praised the conjunction of Brown I and
Brown II as, in effect, an appropriate balancing of "principle" and
"expedience"-an equipoise that, Bickel argued more generally, should be
characteristic of all constitutional law rulings.4 2 In this conceptualization,
Bickel revealed his view of the anti-Lochner proposition as the central
organizing doctrine of constitutional law.
By contrast, from the dominant legal perspective today, Brown If is
generally viewed as wholly inconsistent with, even a betrayal of, the
38. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
39. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
40. See BURT, supra note 24, at 277-85.
41. BICKEL, THE MORALrrY OF CONSENT, supra note 18. at 106.
42. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH. supra note 3, at 68-69, 247-54. "('All deliberate
speed' in Brown II is a] phrase... that resembles poetry and resembles equity techniques of discretionary
accommodation between principle and expediency, but that fits precisely one thing only. namely, the unique
function of judicial review in the American system." Id at 253-54.
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constitutional rule announced in Brown L" This prevalent contemporary view
is, however, only a measure of how much the anti-Lochner proposition has
been displaced today as the dominant model for constitutional law. Brown
today is jurisprudentially viewed in the same way that Roe is regarded: as a
proclamation of high abstract principle that, if properly derived from
constitutional law sources, should dispositively end all social dispute and be
faithfully obeyed by everyone. This is the sense in which Roe has become the
paradigmatic exercise of judicial authority in constitutional law today.
There was, however, an intermediate step between the shift from anti-
Lochner to Roe as organizing jurisprudential paradigms. For my generation, the
central event was Brown itself. Alex Bickel never took this next step. Though
he endorsed Brown, his approbation was always based on his commitment to
anti-Lochner and was always cautiously qualified; Alex always viewed Brown
as an exceptional and highly risky judicial enterprise because of its ambitious
reach and disruptive social impact." My generation, however, was attracted
by Brown's ambition and unfazed by much of the turmoil that followed from
it.
We generalized Brown as an exercise of judicial authority. Even within
Alex's conception of the Court's role-supporting the democratic process of
accommodation among political antagonists and remaining properly confined
to small-scale, incremental remedial measures-we saw applications for Brown
far beyond the specific context of Southern race relations. We saw many other
such buried disputes in American social life where one side dominated the
public arena and virtually deprived its aggrieved, suppressed opponents of any
voice or any acknowledged participation in the processes of political
bargaining.
Race relations in the North was one such context, where, unlike in the
South, officially enforced segregation was not the central instrument of race
subordination.45 Political relations between the rich and the poor, a category
that overlapped but was not coterminous with race, was another such context.
Relations between criminal justice institutions-the police, criminal courts, and
prisons-and accused or convicted criminals, another category that overlapped
with race, was yet another such context. And so the list of such unequal
relationships grew: relations between overrepresented rural voters and
underrepresented urban residents, between enfranchised citizens and aliens who
could not protect themselves through voting participation, between men who
monopolized political authority and women who were wrongfully absent from
participation in public life,.and between the advocates of conventional sexual
morality and gays or lesbians.
43. See Robert A. Burt, Brown's Reflection, 103 YALE LJ. 1483, 1494 (1994).
44. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 99. 150-51
(1978) [hereinafter BICKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS].
45. SAMUEL LUBELL, wHITE AND BLACK: TEST OF A NATION 140-45 (1966).
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In all of these social relationships, the Brown analogy beckoned; all
increasingly seemed plausible and important candidates for ameliorative
judicial attention and appropriate applications of Brown's conception of judicial
authority. And in many of these contexts, the Warren Court responded in the
Brown mode by identifying and denouncing the inequality in the relationship
while, for the most part, implementing small-scale remedies that served less
to eliminate the inequality than to enhance the social visibility and political
bargaining strength of the disfavored group.4 6 But Alex Bickel was not happy
with these extensions of Brown. He was much more transfixed by the grand
sweep of the Warren Court's egalitarian rhetoric, and was inclined to overlook
the practical modesty of many of its remedial measures. He saw what he
regarded as too much of the bad old days of Lochner in the Court's self-
confident rhetoric and too little self-conscious agonizing about the limited role
of judicial interventions in a democratic polity.47 Bickel was, moreover, not
alone in this criticism of the Warren Court; his complaints were typical among
dominant legal scholars of the late 1950's and early 1960's." There were
academic defenders of the Warren Court at the time,4 9 but their voices were
muted because they could not muster a jurisprudential theory with the same
apparently comprehensive force as the anti-Lochner proposition that was
brandished by Bickel and other critics.
But in the 1960's, in the transition from Alex's generation to mine, anti-
Lochner receded and Brown moved forward as the paradigmatic expression of
judicial authority. This shift brought increased approbation for the Warren
46. Thus the Warren Court found a constitutional basis for condemning distincuons between rich and
poor in limited circumstances. See, e.g.. Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (guaranteeing indigent
defendant's right to criminal trial counsel); Griffin v. Illinois. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (guaranteeing indigent
defendant's right to criminal trial transcript). Similarly, the Court found a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
for police-station interrogations, but permitted uncounseled waiver of the right. Miranda v. Arizona. 384
U.S. 436, 474 (1966). In addressing the death penalty, the Warren Court moved with a similar admixture
of bold condemnation leading only to cautiously modest procedural changes. See. e.g.. Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968) (barring exclusion of death-penalty opponents from capital case junes). See
generally BURT, supra note 24, at 329-30. Regarding discrimination against illegitimate children, the
Warren Court also issued sweeping condemnations but nonetheless left room for continued state
differentiations. Compare Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating exclusion of illegitimate
children from wrongful death act recovery) and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins.. 391 U.S. 73
(1968) (same) with Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971) (approving exclusion of illegitimate children
from intestate inheritance). See generally John Hart Ely. The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe
v. Wade, 82 YALE LJ. 920, 943-45 (1973) (defending Warren Court against charges of overbroad
pronouncements of constitutional law).
47. See BIcKEL, IDEA OF PROGRESS, supra note 44. at 173-81.
48. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., Foreword: The Tune Chart of the Justices. 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 100-01
(1959); Philip B. Kurland, Foreword: Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legulaive and Executive
Branches of Government, 78 HARV. L. REV: 143, 144-45. 162-63 (1964); Wechsler. supra note 17. at
31-35. Judge Learned Hand similarly criticized the Warren Court in his 1958 Oliver Wendell Holmes
Lectures at the Harvard Law School. HAND. supra note 17. at 45-46. 54-55. 61-66; see also GERALD
GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 654-61, 664-66 (1994).
49. See, e.g., Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions. 69 YALE Li. 421
(1960); Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor lVechsler, 108
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1959).
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Court both from the academy and from society at large. Though it was not so
clear to me when Alex was my teacher, I have come to believe that there was
a fundamental difference between our generations, and between Alex and me,
that goes a long way toward accounting for this shift in attitude. It seems to
me now that he (and the dominant voices in his generation) remained
exclusively committed to anti-Lochner and viewed Brown as an exceptional
and risky judicial enterprise, while I (and the dominant voices in my
generation) came to view Brown as the paradigmatic exercise of judicial
authority, because we had different views and different social experiences
regarding the essential unity and amicability of American society. We differed
about the proper conception of judicial authority because we disagreed about
the true strength of the accommodationist impulse in American social life.
There are at least three possible bases for this fundamental difference in
perspective. The first is a difference between all Americans of Alex's
generation and mine. His generation had lived through the Great Depression
and then the Second World War. They saw and felt its impact on their lives,
and knew in their bones the uncertainty about the prospects for overcoming the
domestic social disorder engendered by the Depression and the international
chaos of the War. My generation knew these events only in remote retrospect,
in the softened glow of the ultimate victory over fascism achieved by our
apparently invincible strength. My generation saw only domestic prosperity and
peaceful accommodation between labor and capital. We knew that the Great
Depression and Nazi tyranny had ended. Alex's generation knew that the
happy ending had not always been assured.
The second difference between Alex and me is in our experiences as
American Jews. Overt anti-Semitism was commonplace in the daily lives of
American Jews of Alex's generation;5" and Alex must have seen this, even
if he was never directly targeted. When I came into maturity, however, I could
only hear echoes of this anti-Semitism: There were still informal but clearly
enforced Jewish quotas in admissions to Ivy League undergraduate institutions,
still law firms that would not hire Jews, and still social clubs that excluded us.
But these exclusions, these echoes, seemed more like oddities than insuperable
barriers; for my generation, these discriminations seemed clearly disfavored in
principle in American life generally and appeared to be already dissolving in
practice.
50. As one commentator has written:
Mhe second generation, emerging from the [Jewish] immigrant ghetto, found themselves once
more bunched together, segregated from the real, authentic nuclear America .... Social
restrictions blocked many occupational outlets from the ghetto .... Moreover, ... the old
[Gentile] settlers, keeping their social distance, withdrew... to new residences. Socially, at
least, the flight [of second-generation Jews from the immigrant ghetto] ... led to no significant
assimilation in the strict sense, however great the acculturation these American Jews had
undergone.
BEN HALPERN, THE AMERICAN JEW: A ZIONIST ANALYSiS 62 (1956).
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Then there is a third difference between Alex and me-a difference that
marked Alex apart not only from me but from most Americans and most
American Jews even of his generation. I was born in this country, to parents
who themselves had been born in this country. Alex had been born in Romania
and emigrated to this country with his parents in 1939 when he was fourteen
years old. In the short span of five years after Alex and his family fled from
Romania, more than sixty percent of their fellow Jews in that country, some
half-million of them, were killed-first by the Romanian government in
implicit collaboration with the Germans, and then by the Germans themselves
when the Romanian officials appeared to falter.5' Though Alex could believe
that he had found in the United States a home where tolerance was prevalent,
where the accommodationist impulse was strong, where people did not see
themselves rigidly divided and irreconcilably hostile to one another because of
ideology or creed, nonetheless he knew deep in his bones, deep in the marrow
of his personal experience, that these tolerant attitudes were not universal, that
such social amicability as he saw in postwar America was fragile and easily
disrupted.
Considering these three differences alone, it seems to me that Alex and I
lived in two different places. American society-indeed, the entire
world-must have seemed a more dangerous place for him than it did for me.
He must have felt more vulnerable in his America, in his world, than I felt in
mine.
This is, of course, speculation on my part. Alex is not here for me to ask.
But this much was clear between us: He was much more alarmed and agitated
than I at the social disruptions that we both observed in the 1960's-the
violence of white segregationists against blacks in the Southern struggles for
civil rights; the violence among blacks in urban riots starting with Watts in
1965 and echoing in successive years through Newark, Chicago, Detroit, and
other cities; and the convulsions of the late 1960's that spread across the
country and especially onto university campuses in response to the escalating
destructiveness of the Vietnam War. I was deeply disturbed by this violence
and by the underlying social conditions that provoked it. But I was inclined to
view this violence as an excessive eruption of an American dissenting
tradition-a wrongful distortion, but a recognizable version of a basically
healthy American commitment, as Justice Brennan put it in a memorable
phrase, to political dissent that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.""
Alex was, however, much more apocalyptic in his response. In a chapter
he wrote in 1973, entitled "Civil Disobedience, Revolution, and the Legal
Order," Bickel concluded that we were living in "an age of assaultive politics"
51. See LucY S. DAwIDOWIC7, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWs 1933-1945. at 383-86 (1975).
52. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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and that "[w]e cannot survive a politics of moral attack. '53 Alex was not
alone in this conviction. It was shared by many people of his generation who
had themselves directly seen in the 1930's and 1940's, as Alex had seen, the
startling ease and rapidity by which intolerance and violence can displace and
overwhelm peaceful social relations. This concern was especially apparent,
though in varying degrees of intensity, among the four members of the
Supreme Court-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist-whom Richard Nixon had appointed by 1973. The social
disruptions of the 1960's, the "age of assaultive politics" as Bickel called it,
precipitated on the Court in particular a return to an older attitude of distrust
toward openly waged social conflict, of disbelief in the strength of the
accommodationist impulse in American social life.
This distrust is profoundly antithetical to the anti-Lochner proposition. If
you believe that ideological opponents are unlikely to find or even to want
accommodationist resolutions to their disputes, if you are fearful about the
potential for violent eruptions in all openly waged social conflicts, then you
will want some social mechanism for imposing definitive, authoritative
conclusions at even the earliest stages of ideological disputes. This was the
conclusion that Thomas Hobbes reached as a reaction to the English civil wars
of the seventeenth century. For most of the history of the American republic,
the Supreme Court has occupied the role that Hobbes imagined for a sovereign
authority, accountable to no one but itself, standing outside ordinary social
relationships and imposing order on them.54 This was the Court's self-
conception in the mid-nineteenth century, most especially in the Dred Scott
decision in 1857, when the Court tried to impose a definitive conclusion to the
political conflict about territorial slavery by awarding definitive and conclusive
victory to the Southern slaveowners.55 This was the Supreme Court's self-
conception during the first third of this century in its Lochner line of decisions.
And this is the Court's self-conception in Roe v. Wade.
To portray Roe in these terms might seem merely an opening move toward
a clinching argument, a slam-dunk conclusion, that since Roe's conception of
abstractly generalized, conflict-dispositive judicial authority is a direct
descendant not only of Lochner but of Dred Scott, it is thus self-evidently
wrong. But this syllogism does not have persuasive force today. Its
contemporary weakness is evident in the currently dominant view of Brown v.
Board of Education. Brown today is commonly understood as a triumph of
principle-an appropriately authoritative, definitive statement by the Supreme
Court that racial segregation is a moral evil. From this perspective Brown II
is itself a moral evil-a wrongful, even cowardly, willingness of the Court to
53. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT, supra note 18, at 123.
54. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 142-50 (E.P. Dutton 1950) (1651).
55. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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tolerate the perpetuation of racist practices that it had correctly condemned in
Brown I; and from this perspective, the error in Brown II was its application
of the conception of incremental, accommodationist judicial authority of the
anti-Lochner proposition. Brown today appears justified only as an application
of the abstractly generalized, conflict-dispositive conception of judicial
authority that Lochner itself embodied.
From this contemporary perspective, the problem in Dred Scott and in
Lochner was not in the Court's conception of judicial authority; the error was
in the substantive moral norm applied by the Court to protect slaveowners'
"property" or employers' "liberty." This is also the contemporary perspective,
the internally consistent logic, of those like Judge Bork and Justice Scalia who
oppose Roe on the ground that the Constitution says nothing about abortion or
privacy. This criticism does not reject the Lochner conception of judicial
authority; it implicitly relies on it by claiming that the Court can assert its
independent authority when and only when the Constitution itself speaks in
authoritative, dispositive terms.
The anti-Lochner proposition has faded today because contemporary
America looks so much like the country that the Justices imagined they saw
when they decided Dred Scott and Lochner. To them, the accommodationist
impulse seemed if not dead, then on its way toward extinction, and violent
conflict seemed the only plausible outcome unless some authoritative body,
somewhere, somehow, would impose a conclusive end to the dispute. This
same conviction about the prevalence and irreconcilable character of
contemporary social conflict is, I believe, the background assumption that
makes the authoritative, dispositive conception of judicial authority in Roe v.
Wade so plausible, so attractive, today.
Though all of us today think we see the same social conflicts, there is a
striking generational difference in what we see. To put the difference in
broadest generalized outline: Alex's generation is more likely to be fearful
about, and more ready to suppress, divisive societal conflicts than mine; my
generation is more optimistic about the possibilities of ameliorating these
conflicts than my teachers' generation, but more disturbed by these conflicts
than my students' generation; and my students' generation is more inclined to
view apparently irreconcilable social conflict as an essentially irremediable,
and even an unremarkable, state of affairs.
Today's students were born around 1970-around the time when optimistic
assumptions of my generation about the character of our public life were
apparently unraveling. The litany of events is distressing to recount: the
assassinations of Martin Luther King and Robert Kennedy that in themselves
seemed to mark the end of hopeful prospects for racial reconciliation; the
destructive, mindless escalation of the Vietnam War, with the domestic turmoil
that preceded and the recriminations that followed our ignominious and (I
would say) deserved defeat; the Watergate affair that revealed pervasive
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corruption and cynicism at the highest reaches of our public life, culminating
not only in the first resignation of a Vice President, who in effect admitted that
he had accepted bribes in office, but also in the first resignation of a President,
who nonetheless admitted nothing.
These events were shocking for me and my generation because they were
so radically inconsistent with our past experience. These events were more
than shocking for Alex Bickel; they provoked his apocalyptic warnings because
they were all too consistent with earlier terrible times that he and his
generation had known, times when the survival of democracy was very much
in doubt. But these events, it seems to me, are neither as shocking nor as
frightening to the current generation of students. I suspect that my students are
not surprised by these events because their generation does not believe as
strongly as I did in the possible success, or even in the plausibility, of appeals
to reasonableness and mutuality in our public life. I suspect that my students
do not find these events alarming, and do not fear the contemporary absence
of moderating, accommodationist virtues of reasonableness and mutuality in
social discourse because they have never directly known what Alex Bickel and
his generation experienced during the 1930's and 1940's.
There is a peculiar quality to our public life today. Our affairs are
conducted in a rhetoric of pitched battle, of civil war on the right and on the
left. The right calls for Armageddon-like clashes between good and evil
regarding abortion, sexual behavior, "family values," and the like. The left
trumpets constant alarms about racial or sexual genocide and appears to
endorse preemptive violence. And yet, overall, calm seems to prevail. For the
most part eruptive forces somehow seem contained (primarily within inner-city
neighborhoods) and public business generally proceeds "as usual"--as if the
apocalyptic rhetoric need not be taken seriously, as if it were just so much
meaningless background noise.
To my ears, however, this noise is increasingly ominous. As I grow older,
I take more seriously Alex Bickel's warning about the mortal danger in
societies where mutual respect is not a strong motivating force in public life,
where common interests are unlikely to be recognized much less to prevail,
and where no bases exist for common understanding. My students, however,
seem to take for granted that the social conditions Bickel described and feared
are an accurate, perhaps regrettable, but nonetheless unalterable portrait of
American society today. As I see it, the contemporary prevalence of this
assumption parallels the attitudes of the generation of the 1860's-the
generation that talked about civil war, even advocated it, but did not believe
it would ever happen; the generation that then was engulfed by the bloodiest,
most destructive war in this country's history.56
56. See DAVID M. Po'Rr, LINCOLN AND HIS PARTY IN THE SECESSION CRISIS 47-54 (1942); DAVID
M. POTTER. THE SOUTH AND SECTIONAL CONFLICT 236-37, 254-56 (1968).
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The generation of the 1860's had lost the habit of resolving sharply
contested ideological disputes by working toward mutually satisfactory,
mutually respectful accommodations. It had obliterated even the vocabulary for
such social relationships, as the Supreme Court starkly revealed in the Dred
Scott case.57 And this is the danger that I see in the current generation's
attitude toward the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade-not in its
substantive outcome, not in the abortion issue as such, but in the underlying
attitude about the irreconcilable character of ideological disputes that the
decision represents.
There are troubling specific parallels between our time and the era that
culminated in the Civil War. Just as the predominant public rhetoric shifted
during the first half of the nineteenth century, from advocacy for peaceful race
relations (however ambivalently avowed and haltingly implemented) to the
openly sworn conviction of irreconcilable racial hostility," this same
progression has occurred in public discourse during the last half of this century
regarding black-white relations. And just as nineteenth-century antebellum
acknowledgment and then espousal of openly waged racial hostility came to
dominate all American political relations-white-white, as well as white-black
and white-Native American 59-so too, this repetitive pattern is becoming
evident in the openly antagonistic politics of our time.
Consider the warning in 1968 by the National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, the so-called Kemer Commission, convened in response to
black urban riots, that "[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one black,
one white" but that "[t]his deepening racial division is not inevitable. The
movement apart can be reversed. Choice is still possible."'w Compare the
reconciliatory ambition of that warning with the progression of attitudes in the
past thirty years regarding the administration of criminal law-where race
relations is always a subtext and often an avowed text. Compare the high point
of public sentiment in the late 1960's for abolishing capital punishment and the
widespread endorsement of the goal of rehabilitation for convicted criminals
(however ambivalently avowed and haltingly implemented) with the current
overwhelming popularity of the death penalty, the wholesale repudiation of the
rehabilitative ideal, and the escalating numbers of prisoners and lengths of
prison terms. 6' And for one small sign of the spreading assumption that
irreconcilable conflict is the fundamental characteristic of all political relations,
consider this observation by Judge Bork:
57. See WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, THE ROAD TO DISUNION: SECESSIONIsM AT BAY 1776-1854, at
556-60 (1990); DAVID M. POTTER, THE IMPENDING CRISIS 1848-1861, at 439-47 (1976).
58. See BuRT, supra note 24, at 155-72.
59. Id. at 172-99.
60. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS. REPORT I (1968).
61. See generally Robert A. Burt, Cruelty, Hypocrisy and the Rehabilitatve Ideal in Corrections, 16
IN'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 359 (1993).
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[O]ur public moral debates over such matters as abortion and capital
punishment have been interminable and inconclusive because we start
from different premises and have no way of convincing each other as
to which are the proper premises .... [Liberal] law professors ... are
as unlikely to convince me as I am to convince them. That is
why ... we should vote about these matters rather than litigate
them .... [E]lected legislators [are] under no obligation to justify
moral and political choices by a philosophy to which all must
consent.
62
In this vision of political relations, there is no special role assigned to
conversation, no special virtue in the pursuit of mutuality. Voting, as Bork
imagines it, is not a deliberative process with persuasion as its goal; we vote,
rather than deliberate together, because "we start from different premises and
have no way of convincing each other" and neither "elected legislators" nor the
victorious voters have any obligation to justify their choices to their defeated
opponents. The hands raised for this silent voting, these mute confrontations,
may have no weapons in them, but Bork does not acknowledge the close
connection between this show of armed force and more openly practiced
hostilities. In this bleak, constricted conception of political relations, each of
us is alone. To return to the metaphor I invoked at the outset, we remain in
different rooms, unavailable and incomprehensible to one another even though
we appear to be in congress with each other. This is not a happy state. It is a
fearful state where antagonisms will feed on themselves because we have
abandoned any effort, and accordingly lost our capabilities, for mutual
reassurance.
Bickel's generation was too quick to fall into an apocalyptic account of the
"culture conflicts" that erupted in the late 1960's, too quick to forget the
ameliorative results that had emerged from the more terrifying experiences of
the Great Depression and the Second World War. The characteristic
shortsightedness of my generation was our assumption that the deep divisions
in American life could be healed more easily, and that this country was more
unified, than was in fact true. One of the ways that my generation maintained
this truncated vision was evident here at Yale Law School in the virtual
absence of people of color and of women on the faculty or in the student body.
When I was a student here, in the Class of 1964, it was easy enough for us to
imagine that this school and this country were places of mutual understanding
and fundamental unity when the only people we talked to were drawn from an
exceedingly narrow and comfortable segment of the population. But my
generation came to see that this kind of blinkered vision was false and
dangerous. Moved by the ideals that underlay Brown v. Board of Education,
we began a process to open ourselves to previously excluded people-people
62. BORK, supra note 4, at 256-57.
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with deep grievances arising from their past exclusion. Measured from the
distance of 1964, considerable progress has been made-though the enterprise
is still proceeding and is still incomplete.
In the midst of this process, the characteristic myopia of the current
generation of students is to see the grievances and sharp differences that are
now properly visible both in this school and in our society generally, and to
assume that the only things we have in common are those differences, that our
differences are the exclusive defining attributes of our social relations. It is not
as easy to reach across those differences as I and many others in my
generation once thought; but it is more urgent to do so, and more dangerous
to fail in this effort than many people in the current generation seem to
believe.
Law schools are not the only places where these dangers are manifest. In
many ways law schools are protected places, less threatened by the explosive
potential of polarized conflicts than other settings in our society. But law
schools nonetheless are mirrors for these pervasive dangers, and precisely
because they are more sheltered than other places, law schools can provide
opportunities to practice ameliorating efforts that might then be applied more
generally. Addressing the relationship between student and teacher, in
particular, could serve as a focused preparation for turning to more deeply
divisive, more difficult, social relations.
The intergenerational relationship between student and teacher does have
its own intrinsic difficulties. We come at one another from different rooms
even when it seems that we are in the same room. We can, however, learn in
this relationship that to acknowledge these differences is not the last step that
we can take together. With good will, with explicit, patient, and painstaking
effort on both sides, with honest, persistent talk, we can reach toward one
another until we find ourselves in the same place at the same time. We might
then carry this discovery from these classrooms to the world outside.
This is what I learned from my teachers, from Alex Bickel. This is the
best that a teacher can offer a student, that one generation of law teachers can
extend to the next.
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